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Introduction
IMAGINE THAT YOU OWN A CAR worth $15,000; it is in great
shape with only minor wear and tear. Now imagine that your car is
damaged in a hit-and-run accident, and the driver of the other car is
never found. Your car has sustained $5000 in mostly cosmetic damage.
If the damage to the vehicle is more than your deductible, your next
move is to submit a claim to your automobile insurance company for
coverage. Most insurers would elect to repair your vehicle, because the
damage to the car is much less than its fair market value. You take the
car to a reputable body shop, they make the necessary repairs, and
your insurance company pays the bill after you pay the deductible. If
you try to sell that car, you would find that even though the physical
repairs were completed, your car is worth less than it was before the
accident.' If you purchased your car on credit then your loan exceeds
the market value of your car. You are now stuck with that car unless
you are willing to take a loss or you can find some way to make up the
difference. If you re-read your insurance policy, you may come across
language that promises to pay you for "all loss to your car," which you
may think means that your insurer will help cover the difference be-
tween what your car was worth prior to the accident and what it is
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Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 158, 162 (Tex. 2003).
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
worth after the accident. If you live in Georgia and your accident oc-
curred after November 28, 2001, you are in luck because automobile
insurance providers in Georgia are required to compensate their in-
sureds for that difference. This is known as "diminished value," per
the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Mabry.2
If you do not live in Georgia, chances are that your insurer is not
required to compensate you for the diminished value of your vehicle.
The outcome of litigation on your specific policy is unknown at best.
Just over half of the states have considered the issue of liability for
diminished value damages at the appellate level.3 While eleven of
those states have held insurers liable for such damage, 4 Georgia is the
only state where the law is settled. 5 In the states where courts have
required insurers to pay diminished value damages, the courts take a
case-by-case approach that is highly dependent on the facts and cir-
cumstances of the litigation before the court, including specific policy
provisions. 6 This Comment argues that because insurance policies are
usually contracts of adhesion, where one party has far less bargaining
power than the other, courts should find coverage for the insured as a
matter of basic contract construction and public policy.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the basic framework that
courts use in interpreting insurance contracts. Part II will show how
courts have used basic contract interpretation principles to deny cov-
erage for diminished value damages in many jurisdictions. Part III will
study the Georgia law, including how the rule came to be, the decision
that laid it out, and the aftermath of that decision. Finally, Part IV of
this Comment will demonstrate why Georgia has it right, both as a
matter of basic contract interpretation and as a matter of public
policy.
I. Insurance Contract Interpretation Framework
Insurance policies are contracts where "[t]ypically there is dispar-
ity between the bargaining positions of the insurer and the insured."'7
Such contracts are known as contracts of adhesion, "under which the
2. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114 (Ga. 2001).
3. Thomas 0. Farrish, "Diminished Value" in Automobile Insurance: The Controversy and
Its Lessons, 12 CoNN. INS. L.J. 39, 40 (2005).
4. Id.
5. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d at 122.
6. See, e.g., Hyden v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 20 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Colo. App. 2000).
7. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 961, 963 (1970).
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insured is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provi-
sions offered to him."8 In order to guard against some of the harsh or
unfair consequences that could come from the unequal bargaining
positions, courts have several tools of contract construction at their
disposal that can be found in case law and the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. This Comment focuses on three such tools: the doctrine
of contra proferentem, 9 the doctrine of reasonable expectations,' 0
and the public policy limitation on freedom of contract." Courts will
only apply contra proferentem and the public policy limitation where
the insurance policy in question is ambiguous, because "[i]nsurance
contracts are to be enforced as they are written, assuming that there
are no ambiguities in the provisions at issue."'12 In contrast, the doc-
trine of reasonable expectations is not tied to a finding of ambiguity.
In many of the diminished value cases, the insured plaintiff had to
argue that his or her auto insurance policy was ambiguous in order to
take advantage of the tools of contract construction that cut in his or
her favor. t3 The auto insurance policies at issue all contained lan-
guage strikingly similar to the following: 14
8. Id. at 966.
9. If contract language is ambiguous, "the doctrine of contra proferentem requires that
the language of an insurance policy be construed most strongly against the insurance com-
pany that drafted it," because '" [i] t is the obligation of the insurer to state clearly the terms
of the policy.'" O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 288 (Del. 2001) (quoting
Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 697 A.2d 742, 745 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997)). "In
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof,
that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the
words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 206 (1981).
10. "The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries
regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study
of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations." Rodman v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 208 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Iowa 1973) (quoting Keeton, supra note 7, at
967).
11. "[I]nsurance companies may limit coverage in any manner they desire, so long as
the limitations do not conflict with statutory provisions or public policy." Townsend v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473, 477 (La. Ct. App. 2001). "In choosing among the
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves
the public interest is generally preferred." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 207.
12. Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 790 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002).
13. See, e.g., Hyden v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 20 P.3d 1222 (Colo. App. 2000); Allgood v.
Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 807 N.E.2d 131 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
14. See, e.g., Pritchett, 834 So. 2d at 787 ("We will pay for loss to your car caused by
collision but only for the amount of each such loss in excess of the deductible amount ....
The limit of our liability for loss to property or any part of it is the lower of: 1. the actual
cash value; or 2. the cost of repair or replacement."); Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1224 ("Farmers will
pay the loss in money or repair or replace . .. with a vehicle of like kind and quality."
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We will pay for direct and accidental loss to "your covered auto" ...
minus any applicable deductible .... Our limit of liability for loss
will be the lesser of the: (1) Actual cash value of the stolen or dam-
aged property; or (2) Amount necessary to repair or replace the
property with other property of like kind and quality. 15
A contract term is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable meaning.'6 Diminished value plaintiffs have claimed that
the word "repair" in their insurance policy is ambiguous because it
could mean that the insurance company promises to fix or restore the
vehicle, 17 which could implicate "appearance and function" only, or
"appearance, function and value." 18 The definition of repair differs
depending on which dictionary definition a court uses.' 9 A leading
commentator has stated that "[a] vehicle is not restored to substan-
tially the same condition if repairs leave the market value of the vehi-
cle substantially less than the value immediately before the
collision. '20 Alternatively, plaintiffs have successfully argued that the
"of like kind and quality" language in the limit of liability clause is
ambiguous because it "fails to specify the protections afforded by the
policy.
21
A. Contra Proferentem, Reasonable Expectations, and Public
Policy Limits
Once it is established that a term in a contract is ambiguous by
virtue of being susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning, the
(internal quotation marks omitted)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d
114, 118 (Ga. 2001) ("State Farm will pay for loss to your car, minus any deductible. The
policy contains a provision limiting State Farm's liability to the lower of the actual cash
value of the vehicle or cost of repair or replacement, and a provision giving State Farm the
right to settle a loss by paying up to the actual cash value of the car of paying to repair or
replace the property or part with like kind and quality." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
15. Allgood, 807 N.E.2d at 132.
16. Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1224.
17. See id. at 1225.
18. Allgood, 807 N.E.2d at 136.
19. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986) defines repair as
"restoration to a state of soundness, efficiency, or health." Id. at 1923. WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1998) defines repair as "to put back in good condi-
tion after damage, decay, etc.; mend, fix." Id. at 1137. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENCLISH LANGUAGE (1971) defines repair as "to restore to sound condition after
damage or injury; fix." Id. at 1102.
20. Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1225 (quoting LEE. R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 175:47 (3d ed. 1998)). "Unless a different intention is manifested, ... techni-
cal terms and words of art are given their technical meaning when used in transaction with
their technical field." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(3)(b) (1981).
21. Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1225.
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doctrine of contra proferentem may be applied. Courts that apply the
doctrine of contra proferentem choose the meaning of a term that
operates against the party that supplied it.2 2 Contra proferentem is
applied more rigorously in insurance adhesion contracts23 than in
other contracts. 24 For the average insurance consumer unfamiliar
with contract law or the terms of his or her policy, contra proferentem
can be strong medicine.
Most people never read or understand their policies. 25 A court
can strike a term from a standardized contract "[w]here the other
party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term."26 The doctrine of reasonable expectations is more powerful
than contra proferentem because the plaintiff need not demonstrate
ambiguity in the contract for it to apply. In fact, the objectively reason-
able expectations of the insured will apply even though a thorough
reading of the policy would have negated the insureds expectations. 27
The doctrine allows an insured's expectations to arise from an extrin-
sic source, even if the policy is clear.28
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts explicitly employs public
policy as a tool of contract construction where a contract or term
therein is found to be ambiguous. 29 However, a court "will not void an
insurance policy provision absent 'clear indicia' of a contrary public
policy."30
II. How Basic Contract Principles Have Been Used to Deny
Coverage in Some Jurisdictions
First-party insurance claims for the diminution in value of re-
paired vehicles have been around long before the Georgia Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Mabry.3 1 Georgia's rule that insurers are
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 206.
23. See Keeton, supra note 7, at 966.
24. Id. at 969-70.
25. Id. at 968. ("Policy forms are long and complicated and cannot be fully under-
stood without detailed study; few policyholders ever read their policies as carefully as would
be required for moderately detailed understanding.").
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 211(3).
27. Keeton, supra note 7, at 967.
28. Id.
29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 207 ("In choosing among the reasonable
meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public
interest is generally preferred.").
30. O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 286 (Del. 2001).
31. See, e.g., Haussler v. Indem. Co. of Am., 227 111. App. 504 (App. Ct. 1923).
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obligated to pay diminished value damages grew from a line of prece-
dent that began in 1926.32 At the time the Georgia Supreme Court
was preparing to hear the Mabry case, Louisiana, Delaware, and Mis-
souri all issued decisions contrary to Georgia's eventual rule in Ma-
bry.31 A study of these cases will show how courts had approached
diminished value cases prior to Mabry, which will illuminate the sound
reasoning of Georgia's rule in Part III.
A. Louisiana Court Holds the Term "Repair" Is Not Ambiguous
On August 22, 2001, the Second Circuit of the Court of Appeal of
Louisiana held that "where an insurer has paid for full and adequate
physical repair to a damaged vehicle when a first party claim is made,
its obligation under the policy is satisfied and it is not required to pay
for any reduction in market value of the vehicle. '34 This was the first
time that a Louisiana appellate court decided the issue of coverage for
diminished value damages. 35 The trial court determined that the "res-
olution of whether diminished value is recoverable hinged on the
meaning of 'repair." 36 If repair was found to be ambiguous in the
contract, then the doctrine of contra proferentem would operate to
construe the policy against the insurer.37 The appellate court agreed
and purported to apply basic principles of contract interpretation to
find that the policy language was unambiguous, thus "limiting State
Farm's liability to repair the vehicle by restoring it to a useful condi-
tion or a condition as near as possible to its pre-accident physical
condition.'"38
The plaintiff, Townsend, claimed that State Farm was obligated to
pay the diminished value in addition to the repair costs, arguing that
the word "loss" in the policy should be defined to include any loss to
an insured vehicle, including loss of value.39 He further argued that
diminished value is a direct loss to an insured vehicle.40 The court did
not dispute Townsend's assertions, but without any analysis, found
32. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Corbett, 134 S.E. 336 (Ga. Ct. App. 1926) (first claim
for diminished value damages in Georgia).
33. O'Brien, 785 A.2d 281; Campbell v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct.
App. 2001); Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473 (La. Ct. App.
2001); Camden v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 66 S.W.3d 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
34. Townsend, 793 So. 2d at 480.
35. Id. at 477.
36. Id. at 475.
37. See id. at 477.
38. Id. at 475.
39. Id. at 477.
40. Id. at 475.
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that such assertions did not resolve the issue. 41 The Court of Appeal
agreed with the trial court that the outcome of the litigation "hinged
on the meaning of 'repair,' ,,4 2 but noted that "[w]ords and phrases
used in a policy are to be construed using their plain, ordinary, and
generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have acquired a tech-
nical meaning. '4 3 One such technical meaning can be found in the
treatise Couch on Insurance, but the court made no mention of this
definition of repair 44 probably because the plaintiff's attorney did not
argue for it. Had Townsend's attorney offered the Couch on Insurance
definition of repair, the Restatement provision that "[u] nless a differ-
ent intention is manifested, technical terms and words of art are given
their technical meaning when used in transaction with their technical
field ' 45 may have operated to allow the court to adopt that definition.
The court did not make a direct reference to the doctrine of reasona-
ble expectations, but did mention that "[t]he parties intent, as re-
flected by the words of the policy, determines the extent of
coverage." 46
The Townsend court's analysis failed to give credence to the fact
that the policy is a contract of adhesion, which probably did not re-
flect Townsend's intent at all. In addition, the court gave lip service to
the rule that "insurance companies may limit coverage in any manner
they desire, so long as the limitations do not conflict with . . . public
policy" but failed to apply that principle. 47 As will be discussed in Part
III, the Mabry court recognized the principles that the Townsend court
failed to consider and thus came to the opposite conclusion.
One month after the Townsend decision, the Louisiana First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal examined the question of whether a plaintiffs
insurance company was obligated to pay for the diminished value of
41. Id. at 477.
42. Id. at 475.
43. Id. at 476.
44. One definition of repair states:
A vehicle is not restored to substantially the same condition if repairs leave the
market value of the vehicle substantially less than the value immediately before
the collision. Hence, where the property is repairable but after repair the prop-
erty does not have the same market value as before the harm was sustained, such
additional loss element may be taken into consideration. Thus, it has been held
or recognized in a number of cases that an element of damage for which recovery
may be had under an automobile collision insurance policy is the difference in
value before the collision and after repairs have been made.
Russ & SEGALLA, supra note 20, § 175:47.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 202(3)(b) (1981).
46. Townsend, 793 So. 2d at 476.
47. Id. at 477.
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the plaintiffs motorcycle, following adequate repairs. 48 Plaintiff
Campbell's motorcycle was damaged in an accident and he filed a
claim with his insurance company for the cost of repair and the dimin-
ished value.49 Markel, the insurer, paid for the cost of repairs but de-
nied Campbell's claim for the diminished value of the motorcycle.50
"Markel [did] not dispute that diminished value is a 'direct and acci-
dental loss' under the terms of its policy. '51 The court agreed that
"the insuring language of the policy covering 'direct and accidental
loss' is broad enough to encompass diminished value."52 The issue
then became "whether the limitation of liability is broad enough to
cap Markel's obligation to pay it."5 Since the limit of liability section
of Campbell's policy did not include the "of like kind and quality"
language relied upon by some diminished value plaintiffs to show that
the word repair is ambiguous, 54 the court found "no concept of
'value' in the ordinary meaning of the word 'repair.' '55 The court
held the policy was not ambiguous and did not violate public policy.56
The court also refused to apply contra proferentem. 57
B. Delaware Supreme Court Finds Contract Unambiguous
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected a claim for diminished
value damages in O'Brien v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co.5 8 The court did
not employ the doctrine of contra proferentem because it found the
contract was unambiguous. The court held this even though the plain-
tiffs directed the court's attention to some of Progressive's internal
documents that supported the claim of ambiguity, and Progressive's
policy change to explicitly exclude coverage of diminished value dam-
ages after the plaintiffs filed suit.59 The court refused to look beyond
the four corners of the document for extrinsic evidence of ambiguity,
despite the fact that in this particular case, the extrinsic evidence of
ambiguity was arguably strong.60 The court concluded-without analy-
48. Campbell v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
49. Id. at 619.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 621.
52. Id. at 623.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 628.
55. Id. at 627.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281 (Del. 2001).
59. Id. at 288-89.
60. Id. at 290.
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sis-that "Delaware has no policy interest in the coverage at issue in
this case." 61 Even though the O'Brien decision came out less than three
weeks before the Mabry decision, the Georgia Supreme Court ap-
proached the same issue quite differently.62
C. Missouri Court Holds Contract Is Not Ambiguous
Only fifteen days before the Mabiy decision came out, a Missouri
Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Camden v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 63 Camden's car was damaged in an
accident. She filed a claim with State Farm for the cost of repairs,
which it paid.64 Thirteen months later, Camden sold her car as a
trade-in. 65 She was unable to quantify the amount of the diminished
value she purportedly suffered, but filed a claim with State Farm for
coverage anyway. 66 The policy language did not include the phrase "of
like kind and quality" in the limit of liability clause. 67 The plaintiff did
not point to any specific words as being ambiguous, but rather asked
the court to "look at the limit of liability 'repair or replace' provisions
in conjunction with Insurer's agreement to cover loss and the policy
exclusions." 68 The court found that the policy was not ambiguous, so
it sought to enforce the policy as written. 69 Under the court's reading
of the policy, the insurer was only obligated "to pay the lower of 'ac-
tual cash value' or the cost of repair. '70 Most notably, the court
adopted the trial court's finding that "there is no showing that the
value of the vehicle following repair or replacement is necessarily in-
herently diminished."7 1
Even in cases where the court finds for the insurer, courts have
acknowledged the reality that a perfectly repaired car is worth less
than the same car that was never in an accident. 72 Faced with the
61. Id. at 286.
62. See discussion infta Part II.
63. 66 S.W.3d 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
64. Id. at 79-80.
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 79.
68. Id. at 81.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 82.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 286 (Del. 2001); Camp-
bell v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 617, 621 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Townsend v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473, 475-77 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 158, 162 (Tex. 2003). In other instances, courts and insur-
ance companies have accepted the plaintiffs allegations that repaired vehicles are worth
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other recent decisions rejecting an insurer's obligation to cover di-
minished value damages, the Georgia Supreme Court had its chance
to weigh in on the split in other jurisdictions.
III. Georgia's Interpretation of Diminished Value Damages
A. Mabry's Precedent
The first time that a Georgia court addressed diminished value
damages was in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v Corbett in 1926.73
The plaintiffs car was damaged in an accident, and he filed a claim
with the defendant insurer for the diminished value of the vehicle.7 4
The defendant insurance company denied the claim. 75 The policy lan-
guage stated that the insurer would cover "actual loss or damage" to
the covered automobile and contained the following provisions: "[i]t
shall be optional with the company to repair, rebuild, or replace ...
with other of like kind and quality.... In any event the company shall
be liable only for the actual cost of repairing, or, if necessary, replac-
ing the parts damaged and destroyed." 76 The court started its analysis
by stating that "the measure of the insurer's liability will be deter-
mined according to the terms of the contract. '77 Turning to the doc-
trine of contra proferentem, the court noted that "the conditions and
provisions of contracts of insurance will be strictly construed against
the insurer who prepares such contracts. ' 78 Without employing contra
proferentem, the court went on to reason that
the undertaking of the company to insure the owner against "ac-
tual loss or damage" must be taken as the primary obligation,
under which the measure of the liability would be the difference
between the value of the property immediately before the injury
and its value immediately afterwards; and the stipulation that the
liability should not exceed the cost of repair or replacement must
be construed as a subordinate provision, limiting or abating the
primary liability, to be pleaded defensively if the insurer would di-
minish or limit the amount of recovery by reason thereof.79
less than similar automobiles that have not been damaged. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 787 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
73. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Corbett, 134 S.E. 336 (Ga. Ct. App. 1926).
74. Id. at 337.
75. Id. The court found that the defendant's denial of the claim was against the terms
of the contract, which distinguishes the case from the more modern ones discussed in this
Comment. See id. Nevertheless, this case serves as the doctrinal starting point for how the
Man), rule evolved.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 338.
78. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 115 S.E. 14, 15 (Ga. 1922)).
79. Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus the defendant insurance company's refusal to pay any
amount over the cost to repair the vehicle was improper, not on
grounds that the contract was ambiguous, but rather because the in-
surer's "primary obligation" was to pay for the loss that the insured car
sustained.
The issue of an insurer's liability for the value of the vehicle after
it elected to repair the damage arose in Simmons v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.80 Simmons alleged that his car was damaged
beyond repair, but the insurer only offered to pay the insured the
amount of the lowest repair estimate, less the deductible.8 1 The court
applied the "primary obligation" rule from Corbett to the policy lan-
guage. The Simmons court determined that even though the defen-
dant insurance company had options, the contract required "no
matter which alternative is chosen, the market value of the property
plus $100 after payment must equal the market value before the
loss.''82 Simmons was the first in Georgia to stand for the principle that
if the insurer elects to repair the damaged vehicle, it has to be capable
of being repaired to the point that the market value of the car after
the repair is the same as that before the accident.
The same appellate court that decided Simmons heard State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Smith8 3 in 1969. Smith's car was hit
by a train and he eventually sold it as salvage for about twenty percent
of its pre-accident value.8 4 State Farm offered to pay Smith the cost of
repair minus the deductible, but Smith argued for diminished market
value .85
The appellate court laid one more stone in the path leading up
to Mabry when it went on to articulate the insurer's options under a
policy such as the one at issue there. Under Smith, insurers had the
following choices:
(1) To replace the property with other of like kind and quality less
depreciation and deductible, (2) pay the loss in money (the loss
being the difference in the market value measured immediately
before and after the collision), less any deductible, or (3) if the
insurer elects to repair it may do so, but to the extent that repairs
do not restore to the market value immediately before the colli-
80. 143 S.E.2d 55 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
81. Id. at 57-58.
82. Id. at 57.
83. 167 S.E.2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969).
84. Id. at 611.
85. Id.
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sion, the insurer is obligated to compensate for the difference, the
total liability reduced by any deductible. 86
Finally, the Smith decision set Georgia apart from its sister juris-
dictions when the court declared that "the insured must be made
whole, except for any deductible, under any option.
8 7
In part, courts are hesitant to find insurers liable for diminished
value damages because payment of such damages is usually demanded
under the principle of making the plaintiff whole, which is the stan-
dard in torts and third-party insurance claims, not first-party claims on
an insurance contract.88 Despite the risqu6 nature of the court of ap-
peals' holding in Smith, it denied rehearing just fourteen days later.8 9
Nearly ten years later, another Georgia Court of Appeals heard
United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Welch, a diminished value claim on an
insurance policy very similar to that at issue in Mabry.90 After the plain-
tiffs car was damaged, the "repairer would not guarantee the condi-
tion of the vehicle, only the parts replaced and the repairs actually
made."9 1 The insurer argued that the insured "should be held to the
literal terms of the policy that if the vehicle is repaired the insured
must accept the cost of repairs even if it is less than the actual cash
value of vehicle. [sic]"'9 2 The court disagreed on the ground that the
insurer had misconstrued the meaning or "repair" in the limit of lia-
bility provision as meaning any repair, whereas the court construed
"repair to mean restoration of the vehicle to substantially the same
condition and value as existed before the damage occurred."9 3
B. The Mabry Decision
The final word on an insurance company's obligation to pay di-
minished value damages to its policyholders in Georgia came when
two such policyholders brought a class action suit for breach of con-
86. Id.
87. Id. at 612.
88. See Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 788-89 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002). Campbell v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 617, 621-22 (La. Ct. App. 2001);
Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473, 479 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
89. Smith, 167 S.E.2d at 612.
90. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 294 S.E.2d 713, 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) ("Appellee's
automobile was insured by appellant insurer in a policy which provided collision coverage
with a liability limit of the lesser of the actual cash value of the damaged vehicle or the
amount necessary to repair or replace the vehicle, less $200 deductible.").
91. Id. at 714.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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tract against State Farm. 94 The plaintiffs alleged that State Farm failed
to pay them part of the losses they sustained-namely that State Farm
did not pay, or even tell them about, the diminution in value of their
vehicles caused by the physical damage. 95 The complaint also called
for injunctive relief based on State Farm's knowledge of its contrac-
tual obligations, avoiding the contractual obligations, failure to estab-
lish a procedure for handling diminished value claims, and failure to
inform policyholders of such coverage or pay.96 In December 2000,
the trial court entered an order declaring that State Farm had to (1)
pay diminished value claims; (2) evaluate the vehicle for diminished
value when a loss is reported; and (3) either deny the presence of
diminution in value or affirm and pay for it at the end of the adjust-
ment and repair process. The court also issued an injunction ordering
State Farm to develop and appropriate methodology and procedure
to determine first-party physical damage claims for diminution in
value. 97 The trial court certified a class consisting of insureds, whose
State Farm policies were issued in Georgia, for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief.98 State Farm filed an appeal challenging the class certifica-
tion and the order granting plaintiffs declaratory and injunctive
relief. 99
The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the trial court's class certifi-
cation.100 Turning to the substantive merits of the case, the court
framed the central issue in terms of "the scope of State Farm's con-
tractual promise to compensate its policyholders for their losses."'u "
The policy language at issue was State Farm's promise to pay for the
car's loss minus any deductible and the limit of liability provision lim-
iting State Farm's "liability to the lower of the actual cash value of the
vehicle or the cost of repair or replacement." 10 2 Further, there was "a
provision giving State Farm the right to settle a loss by paying up to
the actual cash value of the car or paying 'to repair or replace the
property or part with like kind and quality."'' 10 "That provision also
require[d] that the policyholder pay for any 'betterment' resulting
94. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 116 (Ga. 2001).
95. Id. at 115-16.
96. Id.
97. ld. at 124.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 117.
101. Id. at 118.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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from repair or replacement." 10 4 To clarify what was at issue, the court
noted that "[t] he conflict central to this case arises when State Farm
determines that the vehicle is not a total loss and exercises its option
to repair,"'1 5 because the concept of diminished value is a problem
even when the car has been repaired perfectly.10 6 In the declaratory
judgment portion of the case, the trial court dealt with three issues:
(1) whether the fact of physical damage diminishes the value of a vehi-
cle, even if repairs return it to pre-loss appearance and function; (2) if
so, whether State Farm's policies obligate it to compensate insureds
for that loss of value; and (3) if State Farm is obligated to pay the
diminished value, whether it must assess that loss along with the other
elements of physical damage when the insured makes a general claim
of loss. 10 7 The court addressed each issue in turn, answering each in
the affirmative and thus upholding the determinations of the trial
court on all counts. 10 8
As to the first issue, State Farm argued that the diminished value
of the vehicle is an issue only when the vehicle is assessed as a total loss
or "when repairs cannot return the vehicle to its pre-loss condition in
terms of appearance and function." 10 9 Further, State Farm argued
against a diminution in value and in the alternative, if there was such a
diminution in value, it would not be realized until the vehicle's sale." 0
Finally, State Farm "denie[d] any duty to assess vehicles for diminu-
tion in value unless the insured specifically makes a claim, separate
from the original claim of loss, that the vehicle has lost value even
though the physical damage to it was repaired."'I The trial court had
found potential for diminution in value in every loss, even when the
vehicle is properly repaired.11 2 In reaching that factual finding, the
court "acknowledged that there is a common perception that a
wrecked vehicle is worth less simply because it has been wrecked" and
that "a potential for diminution in value exists in every automobile
accident." 13 The supreme court affirmed the trial court in regards to
the first issue. 14
104. Id.
105. Id. at 119.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 119-23.
109. Id. at 119.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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The second issue in the declaratory relief portion of the case was
whether State Farm would be "required to pay for diminution in value
as part of its physical damage coverage."1 15 State Farm argued that the
policy language only obligated it to pay for repairs that would return
the car to its pre-loss condition if it chose the repair option." 6 In re-
sponse to State Farm's assertion, the supreme court determined that
"value, not condition, is the baseline for the measure of damages ...
and that a limitation of liability provision affording the insurer an op-
tion to repair serves only to abate, not eliminate, the insurer's liability
for the difference between the pre-loss value and post-loss value."'1
17
As to the last issue in the declaratory relief portion of the appeal,
having answered the first two questions in the affirmative, the court
turned to whether "State Farm is required to assess for diminution in
value without a specific claim for that element of loss."" 8 The su-
preme court easily disposed of the issue by stating that
[n]othing in the insurance policy requires the insured to assert a
right to recover any particular element of damage. If the policy
does not require the insured to claim separately such items as dam-
age to tires or damage to bodywork, it stands to reason that the
policy does not require a separate claim for diminution in value.1 1 9
Having determined that diminished value is an element of loss
even when the vehicle is repaired, that State Farm is obligated to pay
the diminished value losses sustained by its policyholders, and that it
must assess diminished value loss along with the other elements of
physical damage, the court turned to the trial court's grant of injunc-
tive relief. ' 20
The supreme court affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.1 21 The trial court had ordered State
Farm to "develop an appropriate methodology for making such evalu-
ations; to collect, catalog, and maintain any information necessary to
determine the amount of any diminution in value; and to report to
the court the manner in which it was complying with the injunc-
tion.' 1 22 The evidence showed that State Farm had no method of as-
sessing diminished value, so the trial court did not abuse its discretion
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 121.
118. Id. at 123.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 124.
122. Id.
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by permitting State Farm to develop its own compliance
methodology. 123
Mabry is the definitive authority on automobile insurers' obliga-
tions to pay and assess diminished value damages for their policyhold-
ers in Georgia. The injunction requiring State Farm to collect data on
diminution in value, to evaluate all first party claims, and to pay for
diminution in value as they would any other element of loss perma-
nently made Georgia the leader in this area of law.
C. The Aftermath of Mabry
After the Mabry opinion unquestionably established the obliga-
tion of Georgia insurers to compensate their policyholders for the di-
minished value of their repaired vehicles, other plaintiffs sought to
apply that holding to their claims of loss. In Scott v. Cincinnati Insur-
ance Co., 124 the plaintiff's car was in an accident in July 2001, five
months before Maby was announced. 125 The defendant insurance
company paid to repair Scott's car, but then in May 2002, plaintiff
filed an action relying on Maby, for her car's inherent diminished
value damages. 126 The insurance company initially denied all material
allegations, including that there was any such thing as inherent dimin-
ished value.' 27 In its motion to dismiss, the insurance company con-
ceded that in light of Mabty, diminished value is a covered loss, but it
argued that, under the contract the plaintiff was obligated to have an
appraiser evaluate the damages prior to filing a court action. 128 The
court found that the appraiser clause was valid and enforceable, and
that it applied to plaintiffs claim for diminished value.' 29 Thus, ac-
cording to the terms of her insurance policy, Scott was required to
submit the issue of diminished value to an appraiser according to the
contract.130 The court retained jurisdiction over the case. 31 The Scott
case shows that defendant insurance companies will still generally
deny all allegations of diminished value, but this case may be indica-
123. Id.
124. No. 2002-CV-53545, 2003 WL 25507755 (Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003) (order stay-
ing case and denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
125. Id. at *.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2.
129. Id. at *2-3.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *4.
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tive of the trend for the insurance companies to eventually concede
that diminished value is a covered loss in Georgia.
In Nuco Investments, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,' 3 2 the plain-
tiff owned a Days Inn property insured by defendant insurance com-
pany. 3 3 Hartford refused to pay the mold damage claim on the
ground that an express exclusion for mold damage was inadvertently
omitted from the policy on two separate occasions.13 4 Nuco sued for a
declaration of coverage and for breach of contract. The policy stated
that "[i]n case of loss the basis of adjustment unless otherwise en-
dorsed herein shall be as follow[s]: Buildings ... at replacement cost
at the time and place of loss, if replaced, otherwise Actual Cash
Value." 35 One issue was whether the measure of "replacement cost"
included diminution of value. 136
In analyzing whether replacement cost includes diminution of
value, the Nuco court relied on Mabry to show that "value, not condi-
tion, is the baseline for the measure of damages in a claim under an
automobile insurance policy in which the insurer undertakes to pay
for the insured's loss from a covered event."137 The court said that the
rationale of the prior Georgia cases "remains solid" and that "recogni-
tion of diminution in value as an element of loss to be recovered on
the same basis as other elements of loss merely reflects economic real-
ity." 138 To explain why Mabry is applicable to the case at hand, the
court noted that "the Georgia Supreme Court was concerned not with
the type of property insured, but with the measure of damages that an
insurer is obligated to pay when a policy provides for replacement
cost."13 9 The Nuco court went on to explain that "[t]he decision in
Mabry focused on the economic reality of 'loss,"' and that
"[d]iminution of value is an element of 'replacement cost."' The
court stated that "[tihere is no authority in Georgia to indicate that
this element of loss is not 'direct loss or damage."140 The Nuco case is
remarkable in that it extends the central holding of Mabry to other
types of insurance policies-not just car insurance. In their unre-
132. No. 1:02 CV 1622 CAP, 2005 "NL 3307089 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2005) (order denying
in part and granting in part defendant's motion for summary judgment).
133. Id. at *1.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *3.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 121 (Ga.
2001)).
138. Id. (quoting Mabry, 556 S.E.2d at 122).
139. Id. at *4.
140. Id.
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ported opinion, the Nuco court extended Mabiy to an insurance policy
covering property damage due to mold.i4 That the opinion is unre-
ported may indicate that while Mabry is soundly reasoned and ac-
cepted as the definitive word on diminished value in automobile
insurance, courts are unwilling to broadly extend its holding to other
types of insurance claims, save for on a case-by-case basis as justice
demands.
Finally, in City of Atlanta v. Broadnax,1 42 the plaintiff property
owner sued the city for nuisance due to recurrent flooding of her
property due to the city's drainage system. Broadnax argued that Ma-
bry supported her claim for diminution in value, in addition to the
cost of repair.143 The court declined to extend Mabry and instead used
the rule articulated in another Georgia case that addressed the dimin-
ished value of real property as the controlling rule for nuisance ac-
tions.144 Broadnax demonstrates that Mabry may not have application
outside the automobile insurance context, and in conjunction with
Nuco, any extension of Mabry's holding beyond automobile insurance
cases will likely remain unreported and on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
there should be no concern that the Mabry rule will permanently seep
into the analysis of diminished value outside the automobile insur-
ance context.
IV. Why Georgia Has It Right
A. Basic Contract Interpretation
The obligation of an automobile insurer to pay the diminished
value of a repaired vehicle has been heavily litigated in recent years.145
In analyzing the issue, the various opinions focus mainly on whether
the policy is ambiguous, thus implicating the doctrine of contra
proferentem, and whether the insured plaintiffs expectations were
reasonable and therefore should be effectuated under the doctrine of
141. See id.
142. 646 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
143. Id. at 287.
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 788-89 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002); O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281 (Del. 2001); Campbell v.
Markel Am. Ins. Co., 822 So. 2d 617, 618-19 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Townsend v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473, 473 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Camden v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 66 S.W.3d 78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124
S.W.3d 154, 158, 162 (Tex. 2003); see also Farrish, supra note 3; discussion supra Part II.
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reasonable expectations. 146 To a lesser extent, courts have considered
the public policy limitation on the freedom of contract as a basis for
finding coverage for diminished value, which will be discussed in Part
IV B. 147 Each mode of analysis leads to a quagmire: for every argu-
ment a plaintiff advances, the defendant has a nearly equally effective
counter-argument. In a state that does not have strong, reliable prece-
dent for determination of the issue, adjudicating the matter requires
analyzing conflicting adjudications of the same issue based on sub-
stantially similar policy language. The most recent cases make fre-
quent references to each other, which illustrates that the resolution of
the issue of diminished value damages in automobile insurance may
have become an exercise in monocular thinking: a court essentially
picks a side and adopts the reasoning of those cases in toto, without
independent analysis. This Part discusses the various arguments that
litigants have made with regard to the doctrine of contra proferentem
and the doctrine of reasonable expectations, and shows how Mabry
rises above the quagmire.
1. Contra Proferentem
Contra proferentem applies when a contract term is ambigu-
ous.1 48 The arguments about whether an insurance policy is ambigu-
ous have centered around three terms: loss, repair, and repair as
modified by the limit of liability clause.
Diminished value plaintiffs have argued the undefined word
"loss" in the policy is ambiguous. 149 Defendant insurance companies
have disputed that diminished value of a repaired vehicle is a loss in
the first place, but rather is just a "market perception"1 5 0 that would
not even be realized unless and until the vehicle is sold.15' The Mabry
court recognized a common perception that once a car has been in an
accident and repaired mechanically, it is still perceived to have less
value than an identical car that has not been in an accident.1 52 Loss of
value is a direct loss to the vehicle because no intervening force
caused it-the difference in value is directly attributable to the fact of
146. For example, see discussion supra Part II, especially Townsend, 793 So. 2d at 480
(holding that the policy was ambiguous). See also O'Brien, 785 A.2d at 288-89 (holding that
the policy was unambiguous); Camden, 66 S.W.3d at 81 (same).
147. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.
148. Hyden v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 20 P.3d 1222, 1224 (Colo. App. 2000).
149. O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 (Del. 2001).
150. Am. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Tex. 2003).
151. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 119 (Ga. 2001).
152. Id.
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the accident. Loss of value is an accidental loss to the vehicle because
the collision was an "accident" in the first place. Therefore, the loss in
value is a direct and accidental loss to the vehicle. In Mabry, it was
State Farm's own evidence that helped the court determine that di-
minished value is a loss.15 3 Instead of focusing on the ambiguity of the
word loss, the Maby court took a common-sense approach to declare
that diminished value is a loss in the ordinary sense of the word and
then went on to discuss the more hody debated issues.
Plaintiffs have argued that the word "repair" is ambiguous in that
it can mean to fix-which does not implicate value-or to restore,
which arguably implicates value.1 5 4 Since the word "repair" is often
not defined in the plaintiff's insurance contract, the ambiguity in
meaning should be resolved against the insurer via operation of con-
tra proferentem. Defendants counter with the rule that when inter-
preting the language of an insurance policy, the court must give the
words used in the policy "their customary and normal meaning," and
the court must construe the policy in a manner consistent with the
interpretation that an ordinary person would place on the policy's lan-
guage. 155 Under that analysis, "the generally prevailing meaning of
'repair' is 'to fix anything that is broken,"' which "does not encompass
restoration of value, an item of damage that cannot be physically re-
paired."1 56 Thus, an ordinary person would not interpret the insurer's
promise to pay for repairs to a vehicle to include payment for some
perceived loss of resale value as well. If the word "repair" is assigned its
commonly understood meaning, the defendant insurance companies
argue there is no ambiguity in the policy and diminished value dam-
ages are not covered.
In response, a plaintiff could counter that "[w]ords and phrases
used in a policy are to be construed using their plain, ordinary, and
generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have acquired a tech-
nical meaning. 1 57 Further, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
states that "[u]nless a different intention is manifested, . . . technical
terms and words of art are to be given their technical meaning when
used in a transaction within their technical field."1 58 One such techni-
153. Id.
154. Hyden v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 20 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Colo. App. 2000).
155. Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 791 (Ala. Civ. App.
2002).
156. Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. Ct. App.
2001).
157. Id. at 476.
158. RErSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 202 (1981).
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cal meaning was adopted by the Colorado Court of Appeals in Hyden
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, which construed the term "repair" to in-
clude market value according to the commentator Couch on Insur-
ance.'59 The Mabry decision avoids the fight over whether repair is
ambiguous by giving the word a common sense meaning: "[w]e con-
strue repair to mean restoration of the vehicle to substantially the
same condition and value as existed before the damage occurred." 60
By assigning that definition of repair, the Georgia Supreme Court not
only resolved the issue for the parties before them-it also assigned a
reasonable meaning to the word repair. Defendant insurance compa-
nies have argued that "[a] mere split in the case law concerning the
meaning of a term does not render that term ambiguous."' 61 How-
ever, a split in case law regarding the meaning of a word can be evi-
dence of ambiguity, even if it does not alone render the term
ambiguous, because the judges who write the opinions are reasonable
people and reasonable people can differ as to the meaning of a term.
The meanings assigned by Couch on Insurance meaning of repair
adopted in Hyden162 and the "'fix anything that is broken"' meaning
assigned to it by Townsend,163 render the term "repair". "susceptible of
more than one reasonable meaning." 164 As such, "repair" should be
construed against the insurer via operation of contra proferentem. 165
Even if the word "repair" itself is not considered ambiguous,
plaintiffs have argued that the phrase "repair" as modified by "of like
kind and quality" in the limit of liability provision of the policy is am-
biguous because that section fails to specify the protections afforded
in the policy.166 The phrase could reasonably mean that the insurance
company will "restore to the insured a vehicle in a similar condition in
appearance and function"; or it could also reasonably mean that the
insurance company will "restore to the insured a vehicle in a similar
condition in appearance, function and value. 1 6 7 The definition of
"like" carries notions of equivalence of value or quality.1 68 "'Quality' is
159. Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1225.
160. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 121 (Ga. 2001).
161. O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 289 (Del. 2001).
162. See Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1225.
163. Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 793 So. 2d 473, 478 (La. Ct. App.
2001).
164. Hyden, 20 P.3d at 1224.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1225.
167. Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 807 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Ind. App. 2004).
168. Id.
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defined as 'degree or grade of excellence.' ,,169 "'Kind' is defined as
'fundamental, underlying character as a determinant of the class to
which a thing belongs. ' "1 70 The phrase "of like kind and quality"
therefore includes the concept of value.17' Even with repairs, plain-
tiffs' cars can be worth thousands of dollars less than before the acci-
dent, so their cars were not repaired to a "like kind or quality" because
the cars lost so much value.
Defendants typically respond that the term "repair" as modified
by "of like kind and quality" is not reasonably susceptible to the alter-
nate meaning proffered by the plaintiff, since that meaning would
render the limit of liability clause meaningless. 172 "When construing
the policy's language, [the court] must give effect to all contractual
provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless."' 173 The argu-
ment made by defendant insurance companies rests on the assump-
tion that the cash value of the car and the cost of repair plus
diminished value damages will always be the same figure, thus render-
ing meaningless the insurer's choice of paying the lesser of the two.
However, a defendant's assumption can be refuted with a simple hy-
pothetical, as put forth by the court in Allgood:
It would be the rare case in which the value of a vehicle after a
collision and subsequent repair would exactly equal the cost of re-
pair. Say, for example, a vehicle is worth $7,000 prior to a collision.
After the collision, returning the vehicle to its pre-collision condi-
tion would require repairs to the vehicle costing $4,000, and the
vehicle would then be worth $6,000. The actual cash value under
the "replace" option would require the insurer to pay $7,000. Re-
pair plus a payment for diminution in value would require a payout
of $5,000[,] $4,000 for repair, plus $1,000 for the diminished value
of the vehicle.1 7 4
Plaintiffs can argue that since it is not true that in every situation
the cash value and the cost of repair plus diminished value damages
are always the same figure, then the meaning of "repair," as modified
by "of like kind or quality," which connotes value, is one to which the
contract is reasonably susceptible and therefore the contract is ambig-
uous and should be construed against the insurer. To refute, a defen-
dant could point out that the hypothetical laid out in Allgood "neglects
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. 2003).
173. Id.
174. Allgood, 807 N.E.2d at 137. Although the Indiana Supreme Court overturned All-
good, its opinion said nothing to refute the accuracy of this hypothetical. Id.
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the fact that, had the insurer chosen the 'replace' option, it would
have been entitled to take the vehicle as salvage,"1 75 so that the cost to
replace minus salvage is the same as cost to repair plus diminished
value. However, adding the salvage value of a damaged vehicle to the
calculation may not always make the replace option the same as the
repair option because of market imperfections.1 76 In other words, the
Allgood hypothetical was correct if salvage value is lower than it should
be because of market irrationality.
As the preceding debate shows, consumers and courts alike do
not understand the variables in the diminished value equation, so in-
stead of focusing on contract construction, the Mabry court looked to
economics, public policy, and precedent from Corbett. The decisions
in the diminished value cases from other jurisdictions that were de-
cided shortly before Mabry denied such coverage in large part because
of the argument that awarding diminished value would negate the in-
surer's choice to repair or replace, as laid out in the limit of liabil-
ity.1 7 7 The beauty of the Mabry decision is that it did not fall into the
logical pitfall regarding whether the limit of liability clause would re-
tain meaning if diminished value was awarded, most likely because
there is no answer: on one hand, it is not true that in every instance
payment of diminished value plus cost to repair equals cost to replace
plus salvage (if the insurer has salvage rights under the contract), be-
cause it is entirely possible that there is one instance where there is a
lesser cost and therefore the defendant's argument, framed in abso-
lute terms, must fail. On the other hand, it is fairly clear that payment
of diminished value in addition to the cost to repair will often be a
sum that is very close to the amount of cost to replace minus salvage,
so the insurer still retains a choice, albeit a less meaningful one. Mabry
avoided the question by holding that the limit of liability provision is
subordinate to the primary obligation to pay for the insured's loss,
which is a public policy decision, as will be discussed in section B of
Part IV.
2. Reasonable Expectations
"The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and in-
tended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will
175. Farrish, supra note 3, at 60.
176. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 797 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that "the market sometimes fails").
177. See, e.g., Pritchett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 834 So. 2d 785, 795 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2002); O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 291 (Del. 2001).
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be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations.' 1 78 One commentator has ar-
gued that "the Georgia cases leading up to and including Mabry are
fundamentally reasonable expectations cases."179 That argument is
supported by the statement in Mabry that "the insurance policy,
drafted by the insurer, promises to pay for the insured's loss; what is
lost when physical damage occurs is both utility and value; therefore,
the insurer's obligation to pay for the loss includes paying for any lost
value."180 Most people are aware that the diminished value of a re-
paired vehicle is a loss, as evidenced by the presence of companies like
CarFax and Kelley Blue Book, which help consumers ensure that they
are not paying too much for vehicles that have been in a wreck. If an
insured bothered to look at the policy language that promises to pay
for "loss to your car,"181 and the insured is aware that the car has sus-
tained a loss in value due to the accident, it would be objectively rea-
sonable for the insured to believe that the diminished value of the
vehicle is a covered loss. Further, it is possible for a court to find cover-
age "even when the applicable exclusion or limitation is clear and un-
ambiguous."'18 2 The policy may be unambiguous to a judge who has
the aid of amicus briefs from the insurance lobby, but for the average
consumer, the limit of liability does not negate an expectation of cov-
erage for a loss.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations "suggests that an in-
sured can have reasonable expectations of coverage that arise from
some source other than the policy language itself, and that such an
extrinsic expectation can be powerful enough to override any policy
provisions no matter how clear.' 83 The marketing strategies of many
of the larger auto insurers fuel consumer expectations of greater cov-
erage.' 84 For example, several years ago, Farmers Insurance ran a tele-
vision advertisement that showed a couple taking a picture in front of
a red convertible on a cliff above the ocean. When the man leaned on
the car to pose for the picture, the car rolled off of the cliff. The
whole scene was then played in reverse, and the voiceover told con-
178. Keeton, supra note 7, at 963-67.
179. Farrish, supra note 3, at 57.
180. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 122 (Ga. 2001).
181. Id. at 118.
182. Farrish, supra note 3, at 46.
183. Id. at 46-47.
184. See Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories,
and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1395, 1404-05 (1994).
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sumers that Farmers would "make it like it never happened."18 5 Farm-
ers Insurance now promises that it "get[s you] back where you
belong."'1 6 "The insurance industry, and these companies in particu-
lar, are among the largest volume advertisers in the United States."18 7
However, "[i]nsurance companies tell two different sets of stories at
two distinct points in the insurance relationship." s8 "When selling in-
surance, companies address the dependent nature of the relationship,
palliating the fears that dependency arouses in prospective insureds.
When paying claims, on the other hand, insurance companies stress
the need to balance and limit overreaching." 18 9 The court's role is "to
enforce insurance companies' promises (including, of course, defin-
ing the scope of these promises)."190 After the Mabiy decision, the In-
diana Court of Appeals addressed the Hyden case to bolster its
decision that diminished value losses were payable to the plaintiff in
the case at bar. It stated that
[n]o reasonable insured would read a policy containing a limit of
liability provision like that in Hyden... and assume that, if he were
involved in a collision and turned to his insurer to cover the loss,
he might be left with only one-third of what he had before the
collision. 191
There the court was effectuating the reasonable expectation of the
insured, just as the Hyden court had done for the insured plaintiff in
that case. Perhaps it was the language of the policy alone that drove
the Indiana Court of Appeals, but since "[m]ost people can recite a
few of the more salient insurance advertising slogans,"19 2 it is entirely
possible that the insurance company's sales stories were an undercur-
rent to the determination that diminished value was payable.
'Judges are to determine these 'objectively' reasonable expecta-
tions, not through fact-finding, but through the exercise of a consid-
185. Ocean (Farmers Insurance Exchange television commercial) (on file with Farmers
Insurance Group).
186. Farmers Insurance, Retail/Service Insurance Coverages, http://www.farmers.
com/FarmComm/retail-service-insurance.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2009); Farmers Insur-
ance, Driving Safety, http://www.farmers.com/FarmComm/driving-safety.html (last vis-
itedJan. 4, 2009).
187. Baker, supra note 184, at 1404.
188. Id. at 1397.
189. Id. at 1403.
190. Id. at 1401.
191. Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 807 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Al-
though Allgood was overturned by the Indiana Supreme Court, the case demonstrates how
courts have awarded diminished value damages based on the reasonable expectations of
the insured. Id.
192. Baker, supra note 184, at 1403.
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ered judgment."'193 The Mabry court's holding that "State Farm is
obligated to pay for diminution in value when it occurs [was] based in
reason, precedent, and the intent of the parties."'194 Thus, through the
lens of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the Georgia Supreme
Court decided the case correctly.
B. Public Policy
"Parties to an insurance contract are free to agree upon any terms
so long as that agreement is not inconsistent with.., public policy. '195
"[P]ublic policy requires insurers to disclose fully and fairly to in-
sureds what insurance protection is being provided for the premium
charged." 19" Some auto insurance companies charge a much higher
premium for coverage than other insurance companies, yet it is un-
clear that the company actually provides more coverage. Since insur-
ance policies are usually contracts of adhesion,'197 consumers only
have indirect bargaining power in that they are "free agents"' 98 and
can shop around for an insurance policy that seems to best fit their
needs, but are "left little choice beyond electing among standardized
provisions offered."' 99 It is incumbent on an insurer to provide ser-
vices commensurate with the fee charged, or be very explicit in the
policy language so that a potential customer knows exactly what he or
she is purchasing. Insurance companies do not want the courts to re-
write their policies and expand coverage. The insureds are entitled to
protection by that same rule, so courts should not rewrite insurance
policies to exclude coverage either.
"Insurance is a means by which individuals and organizations
share the risk of misfortune. We each pay a little (sometimes not so
little) so that there will be money to pay for the losses of the unfortu-
nate few."'20 0 Even in today's sluggish economy, insurance companies
are raking in record profits. 20  While profitability of corporations is a
193. Id. at 1421.
194. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 122 (Ga. 2001).
195. O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 286 (Del. 2001).
196. Hyden v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 20 P.3d 1222, 1225 (Colo. App. 2000).
197. Farrish, supra note 3, at 45.
198. Baker, supra note 184, at 1402.
199. Keeton, supra note 7, at 966.
200. Baker, supra note 184, at 1400-01.
201. "2005 profits are up 18.7 percent over last year's profit of 38.7 billion; 2004 had
been the record until 2005." Posting of Cyrus Dugger to Tort Deform, 2005 Was the Most
Profitable Year Ever for the Insurance Industry, http://www.tortdeform.com/archives/
2006/10/2005_was the-most.profitable-y.html. (Oct. 6, 2006, 16:11 EST).
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valid societal goal, it should not come by way of individuals bearing
the cost of a loss that should be validly covered by insurance.
Insurance policies are almost always contracts of adhesion, where
one party has far greater bargaining power and the terms of the con-
tract are not up for negotiation. 20 2 The idea that parties to an insur-
ance contract can agree upon whatever terms they choose, so long as
those terms comport with public policy, is somewhat illusory: the in-
sured can only agree with the terms that the insurance company lays
out or take his business elsewhere-there is no dickering over terms
by parties with relatively equal bargaining power. An individual's only
potential bargaining power is the ability to walk out the door and seek
coverage by another insurer.
If no insurers cover diminished value, then it falls to the individ-
ual insureds to bear the cost of the loss of value to the car after an
accident. If an insured possesses a repaired vehicle, minus the amount
of the diminution in value, then it is more difficult for him or her to
sell that used car and purchase another because the vehicle was proba-
bly purchased on credit and is now worth far less than what is owed on
the loan. In this way, leaving individual insureds to bear the cost of the
loss in value has a direct and negative effect on commerce-for car
manufacturers, car dealers, and the consumer who has less purchas-
ing power in the free market. If consumers are forced to keep their
old cars that are worth far less than the resale value, those consumers
are not in a position to purchase a new vehicle. Thus if diminished
value were a covered loss, car manufacturers would sell more new cars
because then consumers could sell their old cars and buy new ones.
Car dealers that sell new cars would similarly benefit from coverage
for diminished value because, like auto manufacturers, if consumers
are able to sell their repaired vehicles and pay off the existing loan,
more consumers will be in a position to purchase a new vehicle. Used
car dealers would get more business if diminished value were a cov-
ered loss because more used cars would be circulated through the
market. If diminished value were a covered loss, individual consumers
who have sustained the misfortune of a car accident will be more able
to participate in the free market. All insurers would have to do is raise
premiums to offset the payouts on diminished value claims, or insur-
ers could offer diminished value coverage as a separate product. If the
cost of the loss in value is allocated to insurers, there will be a drop in
the insurance companies' profits, but not to the point that they be-
202. Farrish, supra note 3, at 45.
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come unprofitable20 3 and society as a whole will receive the benefits
for which insurance was created in the first place: spreading risk
among society so as to alleviate the impact on the individual. Thus,
the Georgia Supreme Court was correct in ordering State Farm to
cover diminished value losses as a matter of public policy.
Conclusion
"Insurance is the real safety net for middle America."20 4 Consum-
ers depend on their insurers to uphold the promise to be there when
disaster strikes. 205 Since insurance policies are contracts of adhe-
sion, 20 6 the consumer only has indirect bargaining power in the form
of comparison shopping. If the terms of insurance policies are un-
clear, consumers cannot know what product they are actually purchas-
ing. If the terms of the policy are ambiguous, the doctrine of contra
proferentem will operate to construe the policy against the insurer
who drafted it.207 However, determining whether a contract term is
ambiguous comes at a great expense in terms of litigation costs and
judicial resources. The Maby court chose to rise above the endless
bickering over ambiguity2°8 by assigning a definition of "repair" that
reflects the economic reality of the diminished value of repaired vehi-
cles.20 9 The court used the reasonable expectations of the insured to
find coverage because diminished value is a loss and the policy prom-
ised to "pay for loss to your car," which was a simple, straightforward
application of the rule. As a matter of public policy, the court recog-
nized the economic reality of diminished value and the propriety of
placing the cost of that loss on the insurer. As other jurisdictions face
this recurring issue in the future, the insurance lobby will likely steer
the outcome of the litigation towards denial of coverage. The Georgia
203. "In Georgia, where the state Supreme Court recently upheld coverage for dimin-
ished value, the State Farm and Allstate Insurance Companies alone calculate their resul-
tant losses at $209 million." Id. at 41. In 2007, however, State Farm's annual report
indicated that the company's net income for the year was $3.664 billion, up $687 million
from the 2006 net income of $2.977 billion. STATE FARM MUT. AUTO. INS. Co., 2007 AN-
NUAL REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.statefarm.com/_pdf/2007annualreport.
pdf.
204. Baker, supra note 184, at 1407.
205. Id. at 1402.
206. Farrish, supra note 3, at 45.
207. See Hyden v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 20 P.3d 1222, 1224 (Colo. App. 2000).
208. See discussion supra Part 1II.
209. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 556 S.E.2d 114, 122 (Ga. 2001).
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Supreme Court should be commended for its sensible analysis of the
economic quandary that is diminished value and its ability to rise
above pressure from the insurance lobby.
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